It did so without alleging privity of contract between the defendant manufacturer and the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri first recounted that when food is sold for immediate human consumption, there is an implied warranty that the food is fit for human consumption; that "a buyer of packaged food products may recover from the manufacturer upon an implied warranty of fitness even though there is no express privity of contract between the manufacturer and buyer.
The Midwest court noted that some states had refused to extend the implied warranty of fitness to the sale of food for animals, but held the better view was that the same warranty of fitness for consumption attaches "in cases like the instant one where the [animal] food is not in its raw state but has been processed and packaged by the manufacturer.
Although the trial judge here did not specifically mention Midwest when he directed a verdict against Plaintiff, it is clear that the italicized language from Midwest formed the basis for his ruling.
Consequently, the dispositive issue on appeal is the relevance and applicability of those phrases to this case, if any. This follows because Defendant argues the trial court correctly ruled there can be no implied warranty here because, as a matter of law, baled alfalfa hay is "raw" food for animals. Contrarily, Plaintiff argues "that the trial court erred To understand Midwest and its progeny, we look first at common law implied warranties generally and how they unfolded in Missouri.
Historically, implied warranties were said to arise by operation of law under the facts and circumstances of a particular case in accordance with the presumed intention of the parties.
See Worley v. Mitchelhill Seed Co. When implied warranty theory was first advanced as a remedy, the courts approved its use only when there was a sale or other contractual relationship between the two parties to the dispute. Kellogg Bridge Co. Hamilton, U. Thus, a person not a party to the contract could not sue on an implied warranty theory; privity of contract was a prerequisite to implying a warranty of fitness.
Degouveia v. Lee Mercantile Co. Stated otherwise, implied warranties were only recognized in cases involving direct sales, i.
See, e. Dowis, Mo. Schoop, 81 Mo. Sickles Saddlery Co. McCormick, 6 Mo. Significantly, where privity existed, early cases found implied warranties accompanied direct sales of products without regard to whether the commodity or article sold was "raw" or "processed. Schirmer, S. Lane, Mo. In such cases, the courts focused upon the nature of the implied warranty.
Illustrative of this is Sickles, 38 Mo. In Sickles, a farmer sold straw to a manufacturer for use in making horse collars. A dispute arose over payment, with the manufacturer claiming the straw had excessive weed content and did not comport with the implied warranty of fitness that accompanied the sale thereof.
On appeal, the common law implied warranty rule was stated generally as follows:. Nothing in this general statement of the law excluded the possibility of an implied warranty attaching to the sale of "non-processed" or "raw" agricultural products. By , there was a "well-established" rule "that accompanying all sales by a retail dealer of articles of food for immediate use there is an implied warranty that the same is fit for human consumption.
The stated reasons for the rule were numerous, but foremost among them was the promotion of protecting human life. See Fantroy, S. See also Degouveia, S. Duchess Sandwich Co. However, neither these cases, nor any other Missouri case found by this court, have restricted the breadth of the common law implied warranty of fitness for human consumption to "processed" foods, or excluded foods in their "raw" state from such warranty, when there was a direct sale of the food item, i.
As the common law of implied warranty of fitness for consumption evolved, the privity rule was not followed blindly and without exception. Westerhold v. Carroll, S.
To the contrary, "when the application of the rule would produce a result contrary to the requirements of essential justice and sound public policy, it [was] whittled away by exceptions. See Madouros, Mo. In Madouros, the plaintiff bought a bottle of Coca-Cola from a retail dealer. The retailer had bought the subject product from the manufacturer. The bottle contained a dead mouse, and the plaintiff became violently ill upon drinking from the bottle.
He sued the manufacturer directly, prevailed, and was awarded damages. On appeal it was held that the manufacturer could be liable to the plaintiff under an implied warranty theory despite the lack of privity. The court reasoned that society was changing, including the way food was prepared, bought and sold; that the manufacturer was now preparing food, packaging it, and marketing the product to the ultimate consumer; that in such situations, retail dealers were merely intermediaries handling the articles to be sold to the consumer and had no opportunity to inspect the food or drink as it was typically sealed or packaged; and the manufacturer was the party who should bear the burden when processed and packaged foods were not wholesome and caused injury and damage to a consumer.
The Madouros court concluded that:. From the foregoing we discern that the common law implied warranty of fitness of food for consumption in Missouri includes these principles: First, a party damaged because processed and packaged food was unwholesome can recover damages from the manufacturer without showing privity; a direct sale is not a prerequisite to the existence of a common law implied warranty of fitness for consumption of processed and packaged food.
Second, if privity exists, the common law implied warranty of fitness for consumption accompanies the sale of food, even food in its "raw state. With these principles in mind and considering the fact that the Midwest court used the "processed and packaged" versus "raw state" language when it extended the common law implied warranty of fitness for consumption to animal feed, we conclude that Midwest stands for two propositions: First, a common law implied warranty of fitness for consumption extends to animal food, whether raw or processed and packaged, when, as here, there is a direct sale of the food product, i.
If any confirmation is needed for the first of these proportions which is dispositive of this case , we find it in case law used by the Midwest court to extend the common law implied warranty to sales of animal feed. Both cases that Midwest found controlling, Larson v. Farmers' Warehouse Co. More than that, the Larson case dealt with a direct sale of baled alfalfa hay from a vendor to a vendee, exactly the facts of this case. The Larson court found the vendor liable for damages to vendee's cattle on the basis that vendor had impliedly warranted that the baled hay "was not only of the kind and quality ordered, but was, as a lot, generally free from deleterious substances, poisonous to stock.
In turn, the Larson court relied on Gussner v. Miller, 44 N. In sum, we hold that Plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could find that a common law implied warranty of fitness for consumption accompanied the sale of this alfalfa hay by Defendant to Plaintiff.
This follows because this was a direct sale by the producer to the consumer; privity existed. Consequently, whether the alfalfa hay sold here should have been classified as an agricultural product in its "raw state" or "processed and packaged" was irrelevant. Because privity existed here, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Defendant at the close of Plaintiff's case by concluding that alfalfa hay was an agricultural product in its "raw state," and as a consequence, the common law implied warranty was not available as a remedy.
See generally, Pavia v. Childs, S. Vader, S. Clark is founding principal and Ms. Louis, Missouri, concentrating in complex commercial litigation and state constitutional litigation. Louis Lawyers Chapter. Cox Medical Centers , No. SC , slip op. July 31, See also id. Justia Opinion Summary Deborah Watts filed the underlying medical malpractice action alleging that her son was born with disabling brain injuries because Cox Medical Centers and its associated physicians collectively, Cox provided negligent health care services.
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